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Abstract
Why there have been no such trends for demutualiza-
tion as seen in the foreign countries? Mutual companies 
in Japan are very unique historically and internationally. 
Small number of mutual companies has dominated the 
industry for nearly 50 years. Life insurers newly found-
ed are all stock companies, which suggest that stock 
companies are more desirable than mutual companies. 
At present only five mutual companies remain and their 
proportion of premium is 39.6% percent. The hypotheti-
cal answers to the question are that they are no differ-
ent than stock companies as a matter of fact and that 
they are too large to demutualize. This paper will exam-
ine any ef fect of demutualization by reviewing a 
sequence of management indexes of five demutualized 
life insurers in Japan. It is the conclusion that the 
demutualization did not so much contribute to the value 
maximization of the company and that a remaining 
mutual company will have no reason to go through 
labor and expenses of demutualization unless they have 
some special reason to do that.
Keywords: demutualization; management indexes; value maxi-
mization
1. Introduction
Mutual companies in Japan are rather unique in various 
aspects (Sugino 2011). They are only life insurers.1) 
They were dominant in the life insurance industry for 
nearly 50 years after the World War II. There is a big 
gap between concept of mutualism and actuality of prof-
it-oriented company. In foreign countries, many mutual 
companies demutualized in 1990s but there were no 
such trends for demutualization in Japan. Many ques-
tions and skepticism have been raised on mutual own-
ership of large life insurers for decades. Those 
questions surrounded any reasons why most of the life 
insurers are mutual companies and what is the signifi-
cance of their being mutual companies, as against 
apparent and theoretical advantage of stock ownership 
in the modern life insurance businesses. While Insur-
ance Business Law was revised so that mutual compa-
nies might converge to stock companies in 1996, only 
five companies were demutualized out of 16 mutual life 
insurers. In 1980, the number of mutual companies was 
16 out of 23 life insurers and the proportion of premium 
by mutual companies was 95%. In 2011, the number of 
mutual companies is only 5 out of total 42 life insurers 
and the proportion of premium by mutual companies 
are 48.9%.2)
The remarkable decrease of mutual companies was 
not due to demutualization as mentioned above. What 
dramatically changed the Japanese life insurance indus-
try were the Heisei Life Insurance Crisis during April 
1997 and March 2001 and the sweeping change of the 
Insurance Business Law in 1995. Seven traditional life 
insurers went bankruptcy during the crisis and their 
successors were foreign companies. As a result of 
deregulation in 1995, 13 companies newly entered the 
life insurance market. Those foreign and newly estab-
lished companies are all stock companies. During some 
40 years after the war (between 1950 and 1990), 20 tra-
ditional life insurers dominated the life insurance mar-
ket and the era is mentioned as “20-Company System.” 
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Among 20 companies, 16 are mutual and 4 are stock 
companies. Out of 16 mutual companies, 5 companies 
went bankruptcy during the crisis, one company failed 
after the crisis, 2 companies merged and 4 companies 
converged to stock companies. Hence there are now 5 
mutual companies and they are all traditional compa-
nies.
There is a large body of literature on mutual life 
insurers in Japan as a result of extensive and intensive 
study which has lasted over a few decades and there is 
no decisive, definite and one sided opinion on superiori-
ty and inferiority or pros and cons between mutual ver-
sus stock ownership which is a reflection of the life 
insurance industry in Japan (Sugino 2011). During the 
crisis 5 mutual companies and 2 stock companies failed. 
As both mutual and stock companies failed, some case 
study was made in connection with corporate govern-
ance between mutual and stock ownership because one 
of the major disadvantage of mutual company is consid-
ered to be corporate governance. As a result of the 
study on those defunct companies, there was no signifi-
cant dif ference found between mutual versus stock 
ownership as far as important causes of their failure 
were concerned (Sugino 2013). Now it is interesting 
and worthwhile to examine any change or ef fect of 
demutualization of the 5 companies, even though it 
might be rather premature to expect any conspicuous 
effect or outcome of demutualization in case of Dai-ichi 
which converged to a stock company only in 2010.
Obviously the life insurance industries in the US and 
Japan are quite different. For instance, in one of the 
recent empirical study, they used the data of 40 life 
insurers which demutualized during 1995 and 2004 
(Erhemjamts and Leverty 2010: 1014). Between 1995 
and 2004, the number of life insurers and number of 
mutual companies were 1,638 (1995) and 1,061 (2004) 
and 120 (1995) and 67 (2004) respectively. Compared to 
that, the number of insurance companies is extremely 
small and no such data is available in Japan. However, 
the hypotheses used in a variety of empirical study in 
the US, such as value maximization hypothesis and 
wealth expropriation hypothesis etc. as well as any out-
come of such research are useful in the examination of 
this study. That is to say, the examination will be made 
based on the theoretical framework relied on those 
preceding study.
This paper will conclude that there are not many 
meaningful effects or implications as a result of demu-
tualization, which will be consistent with the prevailing 
opinion and general observation to the effect that as a 
matter of fact, whether it is mutual or stock ownership 
does not matter so much as regards to not only corpo-
rate governance but also performance of the traditional 
large life insurers in Japan. It also coincides with the 
fact that three of the 4 largest life insurers remain to be 
mutual companies without going through the time and 
expenses of demutualization.
The numbers in Table 1 were obtained from Nihon 
Table 1. Number of Life Insurance Companiesa) by Year and Type
(A)b) (B)c)
(C)d) (D)e) Total
Mutual Stock
1908 1 15 0 0 16
1950f) 16 4 0 0 20
1980 16 4 3 0 23
2000 11 1 15 3 43
2011 5 8 16 6 42
Source: See the following notes.
a) Japan Post Life Insurance Co., Ltd. is excluded.
b) (A) represents the category of traditional companies.
c) (B) represents the category of foreign companies (or branches of foreign insur-
ers).
d) (C) represents the category of subsidiary companies of non-life insurers.
e) (D) represents the category of other type companies, such as non-insurance 
companies’ subsidiary companies (Sony, Orix etc.), and independent new compa-
ny (Lifenet) etc.
f) During some 40 to 50 years after the war, 20 traditional insurers dominated the 
industry. This is the so-called “20-Company System.”
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Seimeihoken Kyokai Hyakunenshi (100-year History of 
Japan Life Insurance Association) and Nissei-Kisoken 
REPORT (NLI Research Institute). In 1908, there were 
35 life insurance companies including ones under liqui-
dation process and having stopped business. The num-
ber shown here is the one of the companies who were 
members of the Life Insurance Companies Association 
which was established in 1908. The three foreign com-
panies in 1980 were American Life Insurance Company, 
American Family Life Assurance Company of Colum-
bus and Seibu Allstate Insurance Company. Four tradi-
tional stock companies in 1980 were Heiwa, Taisho, 
Nihon-Dantai, Kyoei out of which Heiwa merged with a 
foreign company, Taisho and Kyoei went bankruptcy. In 
2001, Nihon-Dantai merged with AXA Group making 
the number of traditional stock company zero.
Among 7 traditional stock companies in 2010, 4 are T 
& D Financial, Dai-ichi Frontier, Fukoku Shinrai and 
Medicare which were founded by parent traditional 
companies in recent years.
Six category (D) companies in 2011 are Sony, Orix, 
Airio, Life-net, Midori and Nextia (Nissei-Kisoken Report 
July 2012). Life-net, Airio and Midori started operations 
in 2008 and Nextia is a new name of SBI-AXA from 
2010. Life-net is the company founded independently 
without having any sponsor companies for the first time 
in 74 years (Iwase 2009: 18).
2. Why No Such Trend for Demutualization?
The number of life insurers excluding the Japan Post is 
42 out of which the number of mutual insurers is 5 (see 
Table 1). While the number of mutual companies is 
only 5, the total amount of premium by mutual compa-
Table 2. Proportion of Premium Income and Assets by Company Type (2011)
Number
Premium
(Trillion yen)
Share
(%)
Asset
(Trillion yen)
Share
(%)
(A) 5a) 14.23 39.6 116.2 35.6
13 20.33 68.4 170.9 73.3
(B) 16 6.96 23.4 43.0 18.4
(C) 7 1.46 4.9 13.5 5.8
(D) 6 0.97 3.3 5.8 2.5
Total 42 29.73 100 233.3 100
Source: Prepared by the author based on Nissei-Kisoken REPORT, July 2012 etc.
a) This is the number of mutual companies.
Table 3. Traditional Mutual and Stock Insurers
Traditional Life Insurers as of March 2012
Mutual Companies (Prem. : Million Yen) Stock Companies (Prem. : Million Yen)
1. Nippon Life (5,367,387) 1. Dai-ichi Life (3,055,324)
2. Meiji-Yasuda (5,183,13) 2. Taiyo (903,280)
3. Sumitomo (2,589,857) 3. Daido (719,827)
4. Fukoku (589,599) 4. Mitsui (581,650)
5. Asahi (505,453) 5. Fukoku Shinrai (360,917)
6. Dai-ichi Frontier (306,696)
7. T & D Financial (66,389)
8. Medicare (50,486)
Total Premium : 14,253,459 Million Yen Total Premium : 14,253,459 Million Yen
Source: Prepared by the author based on Seimei-Hoken Tokei-Go (Statistics of Life Insur-
ance Business in Japan) 2012.
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nies is ￥14,235 billion (48.9 % of all life insurers) and the 
amount of assets is ￥116,246 billion (35.6% of all life 
insurers) (see Table 2). Therefore the presence of 
mutual companies is still significant in Japan. This is 
because the majority of traditional large insurers 
remain to be mutual companies (see Table 3).
As stated above, 42 life insurers in Japan consists of 5 
mutual companies and 37 stock companies. Thirty-sev-
en stock companies comprise of 4 demutualized compa-
nies, 4 subsidiary companies of large traditional life 
insurers, 16 foreign companies, 7 subsidiary companies 
of non-life insurers and 6 other category companies. 
Thirty-three companies are the ones newly founded in 
the 1970s and later (see Table 1). It is worth noting that 
those newly established companies are all stock compa-
nies and no mutual company was ever created after the 
14 traditional insurers. Even such a company as Life-net 
was founded as a stock company, while it is the compa-
ny pursuing policyholders’ interest to the extreme by 
selling life insurance at half price of the conventional 
life insurers. These facts imply that mutual companies 
do not have so much significance in the modern days 
and that the traditional mutual companies are not so 
much different from stock companies as a matter of 
fact.
There was a dramatic change in the life insurance 
industry in Japan before and after 2000 (see Table 1). 
The number of companies doubled and they were 
diversified into 4 dif ferent categories. Among other 
things, the number of mutual companies remarkably 
decreased from 16 to 5 (see Table 4). There were two 
major reasons for this decrease. First, as many as 7 life 
insurers went bankruptcy in Japan during the 4 years 
between April 1997 and March 2001. It was unprece-
dented phenomenon in the history of insurance indus-
tries in Japan and was called the “Heisei (the era 
started since 1989) Life Insurance Crisis.” Out of 7 
insurers, 5 insurers were mutual and 2 insurers were 
stock companies (see Table 5). In lieu of the defunct 
life insurers, foreign insurers entered the market by 
taking over their businesses resulting in the increase of 
foreign insurers (see Table 6).
Table 4. Dominance by Mutual Companies
Percentage of Mutual
Cos. by Premium
Number of Mutual 
Companies
1980 95% 16
1997 89% 15
2000 85% 11
2011 40% 5
Source: Data of 1997 was obtained from Birkmaier and Laster 
(1999: 18) and data of other years from Seimei-Hoken Tokei-Go 
for respective years.
Table 5. Demography of 7 Bankrupt Insurers
Company History Form Size Lines Group
Nissan (16) 1909–1997 (89) mutual M C G (Hitachi-Nissan)
Toho (14) 1898–1999 (102) mutual M P F (Ota family)
Daihyaku (15) 1914–2000 (87) mutual M P G (Kawasaki)
Taisho (20) 1913–2000 (88) stock S P Independent
Chiyoda (10) 1904–2000 (97) mutual L C G (Satsuki)
Kyoei (12) 1935–2000 (66) stock L C I (Founder)
Tokyo (17) 1895–2001 (107) mutual M P G (Nomura)
Source: Prepared by the author based on Uemura (2008) etc.
Notes: The parenthesis after company name is ranking by income in 1996 (see Table 6).
L, large; M, medium; S, small. The size is the comparison within 7 insurers. C, commercial line; P, personal line; G, 
group company; F, family company.
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Second, there was material reform of insurance regu-
lation by the sweeping revision of the Insurance Busi-
ness Law in 1994. In Japan, it was prohibited that life 
insurers undertake non-life insurance and non-life 
insurers operate life insurance businesses. As one of 
the major deregulation, the law was amended so that 
they can do life or non-life insurance business by mak-
ing subsidiary life or non-life insurers. As a result, non-
life insurers formed 11 subsidiar y life insurance 
companies in 1996 (see note b) of Table 6).
On the other hand, the mutual companies demutual-
ized were only five which were Daido in 2002, Yamato 
in 2002, Taiyo in 2003, Mitsui in 2004, and Dai-ichi in 
2010. Thus main reason for decrease of mutual compa-
nies was not demutualization in Japan. In other words, 
there was no such trend for demutualization in other 
countries in spite of disproportionally large presence of 
mutual companies (see Tables 7 and 8) and some 
Table 6. 20-Company System and 7 Bankrupt Insurers in 1996a) 
Company Name Form
Premium Income
(billion yen)
At present/successor
1 Nipponmutual ￥5,893 mutual
2 Dai-ichi mutual ￥3,884 stock (2010)
3 Sumitomo mutual ￥3,428 mutual
4 Meiji mutual ￥2,519 merged (mutual)
5 Asahi mutual ￥1,713 mutual
6 Mitsui mutual ￥1,586 stock (2004)
7 Yasuda mutual ￥1,501 merged (mutual)
8 Taiyo mutual ￥1,281 stock (2003)
9 Daido mutual ￥1,105 stock (2002)
10 Chiyoda mutual ￥860 AIG
11 Fukoku mutual ￥858 mutual
12 Kyoei stock ￥814 Prudential(US)
13 Nippon Dantai stock ￥670 AXA (2001)
14 Toho mutual ￥598 GE Edison
15 Daihyaku mutual ￥500 Manulife
16 Nissan mutual ￥225 Aoba
17 Tokyo mutual ￥211 Taiyo/Daido
18 Heiwa stock ￥84 Foreign company
19 Yamato mutual ￥56 stock (2002)
20 Taisho stock ￥48 Azami
20 companies total ￥27,834 (95%)
Others: 24 companiesb) ￥1,520 (5%)
Total: 44 companies ￥29,354
Source: Prepared by the author based on Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go (Statistics of Life Insurance 
Business in Japan) 1997.
a) This is the year where you can see the industry picture before the crisis and the reform of 
Insurance Business Law started to change it dramatically.
b) Thirteen companies newly entered the market in October, 1996. They were subsidiary compa-
nies of Nippon Fire, Nichido Fire, Tokio Marine, Dowa Fire, Chiyoda Fire, Dai-Tokyo Fire, Fuji 
Fire, Kowa Fire, Kyoei Fire, Mitsui Marine, Sumitomo Marine, and Zurich Life and Scandia 
Life.
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assertion to the effect that it should improve access to 
capital market, provide managers with more free hands 
on business developments, help avoid bankruptcy, and 
serve for national economy (Tsuru 2000: 99).
This is quite contrary to the demutualization trend in 
other countries. In the US, many mutual life insurers 
converted into stock ownership in 1980s and 1990s (see 
Table 9). Especially towards the end of 1990s and the 
beginning of 2000s, large life insurance companies 
were demutualized resulting in only one mutual compa-
ny in the top 10 life insurance companies and three 
mutual companies in the top 20 life insurance compa-
nies. It is due to the change of product or service port-
folio from life insurance to pension insurance, from life 
insurance to financial services, and deregulation of 
financial services due to the enactment of Gramm-
Leach Bliley Act (Tsuru 2000: 91-92).
In the UK, a majority of mutual life insurance compa-
nies was demutualized in 1990s and 2000s with only a 
few small mutual companies remaining (see Table 10). 
Life insurance companies in UK developed mostly as 
long term savings institutions and the competition with 
other institutions such as banks and home savings and 
loan institutions were intensified owing to the deregula-
Table 7. Market Share of Property and Casualty Mutual Company (1997)
United States Japan United Kingdom Germany France
33% 3% 8% 16% 37%
Source: Birkmaier and Laster (1999: 6).
Table 8. Market Share of Life/health Mutual Companies (1997)
US Japan UK Germany France
Number of Mutuals 100 15 47 53 17
Market Share 35% 89% 33% 26% 5%
Source: Birkmaier and Laster (1999:18).
Table 9. Demutualization in US
Name of Company Year R
Maccabees 1989 D
Equitable Life 1992 D
Midland Mutual Life 1994 D
State Mutual 1995 O
Guarantee Life 1995 O
MONY 1998 O 
Standard Insurance Co. 1999 O
John Hancock 2000 O
Metropolitan (Metlife) 2000 O
Phoenix Home Life 2001 O
Prudential 2001 O
Principal 2001 O
Source: Tsuru (2000: 92), reason column, etc. added by the 
author.
Table 10. Demutualization in UK
Name of Company Year R
FS Assurance 1989 D
Pioneer Mutual 1990 D
Scottish Mutual 1991 D
Scottish Equitable 1993 D
Provident Mutual 1995 D
Clerical Medical 1996 D
Norwich Union 1997 O
Scottish Amicable 1997 D
NPI 1998 D
Scottish Widows 1999 D
Scottish Life 2000 D
Scottish Provident 2000 D
Friends Provident 2001 D
Standard Life 2006 D
Source: Tsuru (2000: 93), reason column, etc. added by the 
author.
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tion of financial services under the Financial Services 
and Markets Act of 2000.
When they demutualized, they were sponsored by 
home savings and loan institutions or banks with the 
only exception of Norwich Union which was independ-
ent and changed to stock ownership for strategic rea-
sons. It is interesting that there was activism of 
policyholders, so called carpet bagger behind demutu-
alization of some companies such as Friends Provident, 
Scottish Provident and Standard Life (Tsuru 2000: 108-
110).
In Canada, life insurance companies have become 
mutual companies so as to prevent foreign interests 
from merging and acquiring them in 1950s and 1960s. 
On the contrary, however, they have again chosen to go 
back to stock ownership under the movement towards 
financial conglomerate around 2000. Five mutual com-
panies including top four companies have converted 
into stock companies as shown in Table 11 (Tsuru 
2000: 97).
In Australia, top 3 mutual life insurance companies 
have been demutualized remaining only one mutual 
company. They are National Mutual in 1995, Colonial 
Mutual in 1997 and AMP in 1998. There has been only 
one, relatively small mutual company named CUNA 
Mutual in Australia. In South Africa, Sanlam and Old 
Mutual, the two largest mutual life insurance compa-
nies, were demutualized in 1998 and 1999 respectively. 
Swiss Life, the biggest life insurance company founded 
in 1857 were demutualized in 1997 (Birkmaier and Last-
er 1999: 4).
In Germany and France, there has been no such 
trend for demutualization, because mutual companies 
in both countries are relatively small and mostly a part 
of business group having strong ties peculiar to mutual 
community (Tsuru 2000: 99)..
While the exact reasons for demutualization may dif-
fer according to various companies, they are basically 
categorized into two groups. One is defensive reason to 
cope up with financial or managerial dif ficulty3) and 
another is offensive reason to gain competitive strength 
or to improve corporate governance (Mizushima 2001: 
5-6 ; Tsuru, 2000: 94 ; Ono 2004: 97-99). Please see the 
reason column (shown as “R”) in the Tables 9, 10, and 
11. In the UK (Table 8), Scottish Provident, Friends 
Provident and Standard Life have demutualized as a 
result of the carpet baggers activity. .
In Japan too, there was some shift from life insurance 
to pension insurance or to savings type insurance etc. 
Then why was there no such trend for demutualization 
in Japan? Some hypothetical answers to the question 
are the uniqueness and nature of mutual company in 
Japan (Sugino 2011). For instance, there is a gap 
between concept and actuality, or mutual company is no 
different than stock company in case of large traditional 
life insurers in Japan. Its presence is so prevalent his-
torically and at present, or they are too large and 
mature to demutualize.
3. Existing Study
1) Gap between concept and actuality
As mutual companies have grown into large companies, 
it has evoked very strong interest and questions among 
many scholars as to what is mutual company and what 
type of company it should be and how it will develop in 
the future (Mizushima 2001: 6). This is because the gap 
has been generated between the concept of mutual 
company and its operation in the real world as unavoid-
able consequences of historical developments (Mizush-
ima 1989: 31).
The concept of mutual company consists of mutual 
sharing of expenses and self-governance by policyhold-
ers (Mizushima 2001: 7). In other words, mutualism 
means nonprofit enterprise as well as mutual assistance 
among policyholders (Yoneyama 2001: 9). The advan-
tage of mutual company is to be able to avoid conflict of 
interest between policyholder and stockholder and also 
to be able to overcome uncertainty pertaining to long 
term insurance contract (Chano 2001; Iguchi 2000).
Table 11. Demutualization in Canada
Mutualization Demutualization Reason
Clarica Mutual 1999 Offensive
Manulife 1968 1999 Offensive
Canada Life 1962 1999 Offensive
Industrial 1969 2000 Offensive
Sun Life 1962 2000 Offensive
Source: Tsuru (2000: 98), reason column etc. added by the author.
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Mutualism was not so conspicuous or it was not so 
considered as characteristics peculiar to mutual compa-
ny before the war as it was so regarded after the war 
(Mizushima 2001: 21; Yoneyama 2001). That is to say, 
large mutual companies after the war have fully taken 
advantage of it as their raison d’etre, because one of the 
most important products for them was the long term 
life insurance. While there seems to be general consen-
sus that mutual companies in the actuality are not in 
line with the concept of mutual company, there are 
some opinions that support mutualism as a backbone of 
the present mutual companies.
Some of the views are as follows. What is really nec-
essary for mutual company is to shift the paradigm of 
management so as to make policyholder interest first 
priority, for instance to return hidden assets to policy-
holder (Mizushima 2001: 14). Mutual company at pres-
ent lacks attitude to abide by real “sharing expenses” 
policy (Mizushima 2001: 15). Even stock company pur-
sues customer satisfaction, then, what is mutual compa-
ny’s customer satisfaction? (Mizushima 2001: 22). 
Mutual company is the method to protect policyholder 
interest in view of the nature and long term contract of 
insurance (Iguchi 2000: 13).
2) Corporate governance
Discussions and study on corporate governance in 
mutual companies has started in 1960s, which is much 
earlier than corporate governance in general has 
become one of the most important issues in the wide 
range of social science both in Japan and other coun-
tries in 1990s. This is because corporate governance is 
indispensible element of mutualism as stated above. It 
goes without saying that governance by policyholders 
cannot be easily done in mutual companies if the num-
ber of policyholders goes up to 10 million to 14 million 
in case of large companies and 1 million to 3 million in 
case of medium company. Even though they have 
invented the system of the representatives meeting, it 
does not function as expected because representatives 
are chosen by company and many policyholders are not 
conscious of their right and duty as important stake-
holder being equivalent to stockholder.
Under the circumstances, it is not realistic to regard 
governance by policyholders as essential ingredient of 
mutualism or mutual company and to characterize 
mutual company as nonprofit enterprise (Maeda 1995: 
122, 127). It is the limitation on governance by policy-
holders (Mizushima 2001: 14) and representatives 
meeting does not function as expected to make govern-
ance effective (Iwasaki 1989: 5; Takao 1999: 38).
In 1990s, seven life insurance companies went bank-
ruptcy. One of the reasons for their failure was ineffec-
tive corporate governance. Among seven companies, 
there were both mutual companies and stock compa-
nies.4) Thus you cannot attribute it solely to mutual 
ownership. Rather it was found out as a result of investi-
gation based on oral history that one of the major caus-
es of the failure was lack of proper management which 
suggests that there was no corporate governance 
regardless of whether it was mutual or stock ownership 
(Uemura 2008). In Japan, there was no effective corpo-
rate governance by stockholders due to absence of sep-
aration of execution and supervision. Therefore, so far 
as corporate governance in the past 50 years is con-
cerned, there should have been no difference between 
mutual company and stock company.
Theoretically speaking, even though there is equally 
ineffective control over the manager, stock form is bet-
ter than mutual form, because the interests of manager 
and shareholder might be concomitant as to conserva-
tion of wealth and growth of the company while the 
interests of manager and policyholder are mostly 
adverse on those matters (Hetherington 1969: 1102-
1103). Anyway, as a matter of fact, there have been so 
many regulator y reforms introduced in Japan to 
strengthen corporate governance since 1990s.5) Hence, 
if they are serious to improve corporate governance, 
there is no question that stock company is more advan-
tageous than mutual company.
3) Diversified views in Japan
There are many dif ferent views as to the issues of 
mutual versus stock ownership of life insurers in Japan. 
The followings are some of them.
• While there is some notable tendency that more and 
more life insurance companies in overseas countries 
are demutualized recently, I do not see so much 
signif icance in demutual izat ion of  Japanese 
companies (Iguchi 2000: 2).
• It is not reasonable that you make comparison 
between mutual companies and stock companies just 
from viewpoint of efficiency (Chano 2001).
• It  is  not  ver y signif icant to make unilateral 
comparison between them (Okamura 2006: 226).
• As a result of empirical study in the US, there has 
been no clear conclusion that either is more efficient 
than others (Chano 2001).
• There is no evidence that it is a historical certainty 
that the number of mutual companies will be 
decreased (Tanaka 2002: 38).
• Whether it is mutual company or stock company is a 
matter of strategic decision making by management 
(Yoneyama 2003).
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• It is not always true that trend for demutualization is 
universe. There are many mutual companies in the 
world who are well run, respected by customers and 
competitors alike (Birkmaier and Laster 1999: 34).
• Modern nature of mutual company is to prioritize 
policyholder interest under complete control by 
manager because expense sharing policy and self-
governance by policyholders are no more part of 
mutualism in the present mutual company in Japan. 
Therefore what does really matter is manager’s 
ethics and strong leadership to ser ve for such 
purposes (Mizushima 1992: 16-17; Mizushima 2001: 
14).
• Because the interests of manager and policyholder 
do not necessarily coincide, it is up to regulatory 
development whether mutual company will really 
pursue policyholder interest (Hetherington 1969: 
1102-1103). In Japan, on the contrary, what actually 
precluded mutual companies from achieving 
policyholder interest in 1980s was government policy 
to protect the industry as a whole (Mizushima 2001: 
10-13).
• As for corporate governance of mutual company, 
Japan might be ahead than UK in that some 
measures are incorporated to make its governance 
system comparable to stock company and that the 
procedures of councils meeting and policyholders 
meeting have been built in the system (Hisamatsu 
2006 : 70).
• Based on the empirical study to find out any 
difference in risk taking behavior between mutual 
versus stock, and “keiretsu” affiliation versus non-
keiretsu life insurers in Japan, it was concluded that 
mutual and keiretsu companies have less risk taking 
attitudes than stock and non-keiretsu companies 
respectively (Yanase et al. 2008). In connection with 
this study, another interpretation was proposed to the 
effect that it was due to the scale of company rather 
than company form and affiliation reasons because 
mutual and keiretsu companies were far larger than 
stock and non-keiretsu companies (Kofuji 2010).
4) Extensive study in the US
On the issues of mutual versus stock forms, extensive 
study has been made by many scholars and research-
ers for long time in the US6) and some of the represent-
ative views on various issues are as follows. As will be 
shown here, different theories such as adverse selec-
tion theory, moral hazard theory, and managerial dis-
cretion theory are entangled in construing coexistence 
of mutual and stock forms, and due to the mixed evi-
dence, you cannot say one way or another conclusively 
on whether mutual or stock ownership is more efficient 
or superior as a form of insurance company (MacMinn 
and Ren 2010).
• There could be adverse selection of customers where 
customers prefer stock form when risk is high, which 
is characterized as expropriation of policyholder 
capital (Laux and Mauermann 2006).
• When the risk is low, mutual form is selected so as to 
enjoy cheaper premium (Smith and Stutzer 1990). 
Actually there is some evidence that stock insurers 
tend to underwrite higher risks by lines of business 
or geographically (Lamm-Tennant and Starks 1993; 
Mayers and Smith 1988; 1994).
• At the time of insurance crisis, no insurance was 
available for certain liability risks and mutual form 
such as Risk Retention Group was the solution. This 
is the example of adverse selection of owners 
(Doherty and Dionne 1993). From investors point of 
view, stock form is the preference when risks are 
more predictable and capital is accessible (Mayers 
and Smith 2002; Viswanathan and Cummins 2003).
• Stock form does not provide such incentive for risk 
management as mutual form does and mutual form is 
more appropriate in connection with the moral 
hazard of policyholders (Smith and Stutzer 1995).
• As for moral hazard of owners, claims agents are 
employed to prevent the owners from delaying 
claims payment (Kim, Mayers, and Smith 1996).
• The owners of stock insurers sometimes tr y to 
maximize the investment return at the expense of the 
interest of policyholders (Merton 1974; 1977).
• As one of the examples of risk-shifting moral hazard 
of owners, there is some evidence that stock insurers 
do not utilize so much reinsurance as mutual 
insurers (Mayers and Smith 1990).
• Stock insurers choose riskier activities (Lamm-
Tennat and Starks 1993).
• Stock insurers take significantly more risk in 
response to the adoption of insurance guarantee 
funds (Lee, Mayers, and Smith 1997).
• Moral hazard of managers such as managerial 
discretion problem occurs when ownership and 
management are separated (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Fama and Jensen 1983).
• Based on the survey of about 60 largest insures, the 
rate of proxy voting at mutual insurers was extremely 
low compared to stock insurers (Green and Johnson 
1980).
• Managerial discretion problem is more prevalent in 
stock insurers than mutual insurers (Mayers and 
Smith 1981). As for property and casualty sector, 
stock insurers tend to concentrate in more complex 
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risks in terms of lines of business and geographically 
(Mayers and Smith 1986).
• In case of life insurance sector, however, there is 
some mixed evidence on the managerial discretion 
hypothesis to the effect that mutual insurers exert 
less managerial discretion but that the majority of life 
insurers businesses are life insurance and individual 
insurance and most of assets are held in separate 
accounts (Pottier and Sommer 1997).
• Executives of mutual insurers are less compensated 
than executives of stock insurers because the latter is 
required more managerial discretion, which supports 
the managerial discretion hypothesis (Mayers and 
Smith 1992).
• Mutual insurers have more number of outside 
directors of board because they do not have such 
mechanism of corporate governance as stock 
insurers have (Mayers , Shivdasani, and Smith 1993; 
He and Sommer 2010).
• Managerial discretion is not the sole factor to explain 
the structure of ownership in life insurers (Pottier 
and Sommer 1997).
• Any function and significance of mutual insurers are 
better explained by the adverse selection and moral 
hazard of customers than managerial discretion 
hypothesis or agency theor y (Smith and Stutzer 
1995).
• Whether mutual or stock form is more ef ficient 
depends on its business model and types of products 
etc. in case of the US property and casualty insurers 
(Cummins, Weiss, and Zi 1999).
• There is no difference of efficiency between mutual 
and stock form based on the studies regarding the 
Japanese property casualty insurers (Jeng and Lai, 
2005), Spanish insurers (Cummins, Rubio-Misas, and 
Zi 2004), the US life insurers (Cummins and Zi 1998; 
Boose 1990).
5) Reason for demutualization
In the US, there are more than one thousand life insur-
ers and scores of mutual companies converged to stock 
ownership. On the other hand, there were only 20 or so 
life insurers and just five mutual companies demutual-
ized in Japan. Furthermore there was no such situation 
as Product Liability Crisis or Insurance Crisis where 
the issues of availability and affordability of insurance 
emerged as a social problem. A supply of insurance has 
been basically stable and continuous in Japan and there 
has been no noticeable underwriting cycle in Japan 
contrary to the US. Under the circumstances, most of 
the hypotheses based on theories of adverse selection 
or moral hazard are not very realistic to apply to the 
Japanese life insurers for empirical study purposes. 
That is to say, any reason for coexistence of both mutu-
al and stock companies and comparison of efficiency 
between mutual and stock ownership are not so much 
questioned as far as life insurers in Japan are con-
cerned.
Then what is more relevant for life insurers in Japan 
is the question why mutual insurers would converge to 
stock ownership and what is effect of demutualization. 
While the number is small, there were 5 mutual compa-
nies demutualized and whether or not the remaining 
large mutual companies will also demutualize in the 
future is a question evoking some research interest. 
According to what Japanese life and nonlife insurance 
industries put together, there are four reasons for 
demutualization. They are to improve access to capital 
market, to have free hands on business developments, 
to avoid bankruptcy (raised by only life insurance com-
panies) and to serve for national economy (Tsuru 2000: 
99).
As stated above, dozens of mutual companies demu-
tualized since 1900s in the US, for which an important 
incentive was access to capital market so as to facilitate 
an acquisition, etc. and mutual companies are no less 
efficient than stock companies according to empirical 
study of 33 life insurers before and after demutualiza-
tion (McNamara and Rhee 1992: 223,235-236). It was 
also found that after demutualization the weight of non-
par ticipating insurance increased (McNamara and 
Rhee 1992), which is consistent with the Daido’s case in 
Japan.
There may be the demutualization initiated by man-
ager who wants to maximize their compensation and to 
manage the company without much restraint (Viswana-
than and Cummins 2003; Mayers and Smith 2004). 
Likewise, it was substantiated that mutual company 
executives were less paid than stock company execu-
tives (Mayers and Smith 1992).
As a result of the empirical study of 41 companies 
from 1966 through 1984, it was concluded that there is 
no systematic difference but a strong significant differ-
ence of regulatory regimes between mutual and stock 
companies (Boose 1990). Thus it appears that there is 
no strong evidence that either form of company is more 
advantageous than other form as a result of empirical 
study in the US.
According to the recent empirical study made on the 
40 life insurers demutualized during 1995 and 2004, 
stock insurers are more efficient than mutual insurers 
and there is a tendency that more and more mutual 
insurers convert to stock ownership (Erhemjamts and 
Leverty 2010). For instance, 33% of the mutual life 
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insurers converted to the stock ownership and the per-
centage of total assets held by mutual companies 
declined from 36% to 10% (Erhemjamts and Leverty 
2010: 1012).
The common hypotheses regarding motivation for 
demutualization are grouped into value maximization 
theory and expropriation wealth theory (Mayers and 
Smith 1986 Erhemjamts and Leverty 2010). Value maxi-
mization theory consists of access to capital theory 
(Butler, Cui, and Whitman 2000; Viswanathan and 
Cummins 2003) and operating efficiency theory (May-
ers and Smith 1988; 1994). While efficiency theory has 
not been extensively examined, some evidence was 
proposed to the effect that efficiency did not improve 
after demutualization which took place between 1984 
and 1995 (Jeng, Lai, McNamara 2007). This is consist-
ent with the above findings of McNamara and Rhee 
(1992).
With regards to wealth expropriation theory, the poli-
cyholders of Dai-ichi were appropriated 10 million of 
stocks with the total value of 1.4 trillion yen and it does 
not appear that policyholders of Dai-ichi and other 
demutualized companies do not have any complaint 
that their wealth were expropriated, which is quite con-
trast to the US where lawsuits were filed against Pru-
dent ia l  and  Met l i fe  in  connect ion  wi th  the i r 
reorganization. The number of policyholders or the 
proportion of the policyholders who did not receive any 
stock or monetary compensation for their contribution 
to the surplus are from 10% of Dai-ichi to 36% of Mitsui 
(see Table 12).
Under the circumstances, the following analysis will 
be made based on the theoretical framework of value 
maximization hypotheses by using the management 
indexes from the Seimei-Hoken Tokei-Go for both 
preceding and following years of the demutualization. 
The questions on any effect and purposes for which the 
management indexes are available and shown in Table 
13.
4. Analysis
1) Daido Life
Daido was founded as a stock company by merging of 
Asahi Life, Gokoku Life and Hokkai Life in 1902 and 
restarted as mutual company in 1947. Their premium 
was ￥1,105 billion and ranked number 9 as of March 
1996 (see Table 6). They originally targeted personal 
lines of business but shifted to commercial lines in the 
early 1970s (Uemura 2000: 170–173). They developed 
commercial businesses in rather unique way by making 
alliance with various business associations or US life 
insurers. They have strong customer bases of medium 
and small corporations. Daido has higher level of sur-
plus, solvency margin ratio and profitability among 
large and medium life insurers. They did not so much 
rely on depreciated value of shares as other insurers, 
which mitigated any impact by plunging of stock prices. 
Table 12. The Number of Policyholders Who Received the Stock or Money
Daido (2002) Taiyo (2003) Mitsui (2004) Dai-ichi (2010)
Over one stock 334,530 (36%) 321,630 (8%) 3,599 (0%) 3,060,230 (37%)
Less than one stock 355,810 (38%) 2,336,503 (61%) 1,681,171 (64%) 4,322,245 (53%)
No stock 238,365 (26%) 1,159,095 (30%) 937,975 (36%) 831,109 (10%)
Total 929,210 3,817,384 2,622,948 8,213,584
Source: Table 15–17 (NLI 2011: 369) modified by the author.
Table 13. Questions and Management Index
Question on Effect and Purposes Management Index
Whether there was a growth? Premium, Ratio of New Business
Whether value was maximized? Return on Assets
Whether efficiency was improved? Expense Ratio, Ratio of Cancellation,
Whether access to capital was achieved? Surplus
Whether financial stability was enhanced? Solvency Margin Ratio
Source: Prepared by the author.
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They entered into agreement of business alliance with 
Taiyo in 1999 (see Table 14).
[1] Premium (billion yen)
After the demutualization the premium has 
decreased constantly year by year and now it is 
the level of about half of the preceding years. The 
premium of 2011 is ￥582 billion while it was ￥1,308 
billion in 2001. The ratio of new business was sim-
ilar with the previous year for several years after 
demutualization and during the recent years it 
lowered than before. Based on these data, there 
is no evidence that the demutualization contribut-
ed to the growth.
[2] Return on Assets (%)
The ROA ratio has been generally not so much 
different before and after the demutualization.
[3] Expense Ratio (%)
The expense ratio deteriorated yearly with 14.3 % 
of 2011 against 10.2% of 2001. So it was not the 
case that the ef ficiency was enhanced by the 
demutualization.
[4] Cancellation Ratio (%)
The ratio of cancellation increased about 2 points 
in 2008 and 2009 but it recovered to the same lev-
el of 2002 in 2011. So you cannot say that the 
demutualization was not well received by the poli-
cyholders.
[5] New Business Ratio (%)
A development of the ratio of new business has 
been a little downward after the demutualization.
[6] Surplus (billion yen)
What was remarkably improved were surplus and 
solvency margin ratio. The amount of surplus 
steadfastly grew and it was ￥194.2 billion in 2011 
although it was ￥86.4 billion in 2001.
[7] Solvency Margin Ratio (%)
Solvency margin ratio exceeded 1000% after the 
demutualization while it was 772% in 2001.
2) Yamato Life Insurance Co., Ltd.
Yamato Life Insurance Co. Ltd. was one of 20 traditional 
insurers. It was a small mutual company with its rank-
ing No.19 and the premium income being ￥56 billion. 
The predecessor company of Yamato was founded as a 
draft insurance company in 1911. It converted to Yama-
to Life Insurance Co. Ltd in 1945 and restarted as Yam-
ato Life Mutual Company in 1947. Yamato was 
restructured into two companies with one being Yamato 
(old) which only dealt with old businesses and another 
being Azami which was founded jointly with Softbank 
Finance to succeed Yamato’s new businesses in 2001. 
Taisho which was the smallest stock company among 
20 traditional insurers with the premium income of ￥48 
billion transferred its portfolio to this Azami. Then 
Azami and Yamato (old) merged giving birth Yamato 
(new) in 2001. Yamato (new) was also an unlisted stock 
company.
Yamato went bankruptcy in 2008. It was not included 
in the Heisei Life Insurance Crisis because it took place 
after the crisis was over and under the world credit cri-
sis due to Lehman shock. The reason for the failure 
was their investment inclined to high risk securities 
(Kofuji 2010b). At Yamato, the average assumed inter-
est rate was 3.35%. Their investment into public and 
corporate bond was 18.1% with stock being 14.6%, for-
eign securities being 23.9%, loan being 9.6% in 2007, 
whereas they were 37.3%, 7.4%, 12.1%, 20.8% in 2002. 
This shows that the investment shifted from public and 
corporate bond and loan to more risky stock and for-
eign securities. The stock and foreign securities 
increased from7.4% to14.6% and from 12.1% to 23.9% 
respectively. On the contrary, the public and corporate 
Table 14. Data of Management Efficiency and Solvency: Daido
Data 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
[1] 1,072 1,308 963 928 884 871 865 843 811 640 657 582
[2] 2.19 1.03 1.47 2.11 1.89 1.87 2.31 2.21 (－)1.81 1.50 1.95 1.86
[3] 10.0 10.2 11.0 11.7 12.3 12.6 12.9 13.6 14.1 12.8 14.5 14.3
[4] 10.0 10.1 9.6 9.7 8.8 8.8 10.4 10.2 11.5 11.5 10.1 9.4
[5] (－)0.1 11.8 11.9 11.1 11.2 10.9 11.0 11.9 9.6 9.2 9.6 9.4
[6] 56.5 86.4 53.34 86.7 101.8 132.1 166.2 186,8 161.5 175.7 183.7 194.2
[7] 757.6 772.0 860.2 1034.9 1037.2 1254.4 1320.6 1096.3 820.7 1120.6 720.6 851.9
Source: Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go (Statistics of Life Insurance Business in Japan) for respective years.
Data: [1] Premium (billion yen), [2] Return on Assets (%), [3] Expense Ratio (%), [4] Cancellation Ratio (%), [5] New Business Ratio (%), 
[6] Surplus (billion yen), [7] Solvency Margin Ratio (%).
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bond and loan reduced from 37.3% to 18.1% and from 
20.8% to 9.6% respectively.
Kofuji (2010b) proposed the observation that this 
was one example of a stock company having more risk 
taking tendency than mutual company. At the same 
time, Kofuji (2010b) pointed out that the president of 
Yamato (new) did not have insurance but securities 
business background. Like the 7 insurers failed in the 
Heisei Life Insurance Crisis, the failure of Yamato 
(new) was ultimately attributable to poor management 
by the president. Because Yamato (new) was unlisted 
company, there appeared to have been no proper gov-
ernance by shareholders. Therefore you cannot assert 
that the company was more risk taking thanks to 
stronger corporate governance, which was the finding 
by Keizai Zaisei Hakusho (Economics Finance White-
paper by Japanese Government) of 2008. In case of 
Yamato (new), the president was almighty and not so 
capable as to avoid bankruptcy. If that is the case, the 
corporate form whether it is mutual or stock ownership 
should not be relevant to its corporate governance and 
solvency.
A change and development of management indexes 
before and after demutualization are as follows (see 
Table 15).
[1] Premium (billion yen)
The amount of premium increased in 2002 and 
2003 but it went down to the previous level. Both 
in 2000 and 2004, it was ￥39 billion with the ones 
of 2007 being ￥35 billion.
[2] Return on Assets (%)
The ROA ratio went very high during four years 
after the demutualization. This is considered to 
be due to the aggressive investment leading up to 
the bankruptcy.
[3] Expense Ratio (%)
The expense ratio deteriorated after the demutu-
alization. However the ratio has been extraordi-
narily high compared to other companies 
throughout the years before and after the demu-
tualization.
[4] Cancellation Ratio (%)
The ratio of cancellation has been improved after 
the demutualization.
[5] New Business Ratio (%)
The ratio of new business is not very much differ-
ent before and after the demutualization.
[6] Surplus (billion yen)
The amount of surplus slightly increased after the 
demutualization. However the amount itself is 
extremely small in comparison to the other com-
panies.
[7] Solvency Margin Ratio (%)
Data is not available to make comparison.
3) Taiyo Life
Taiyo was founded as a stock company in 1893 and 
restarted as a mutual company in 1948. Their premium 
volume was ￥1,281 billion and ranked number 8 as of 
March 1997 (See Table 6). Taiyo was specialized in 
family market and their lineup of products and business 
model was different from other traditional mutual com-
panies. They sold their savings type life insurance with 
the term of 5 to 10 years by a combination of two sales 
persons visiting a family. Taiyo’s financial condition was 
stable with surplus of ￥15.6 billion and solvency margin 
ratio of 873% as of March 1998. They reached an agree-
ment with Daido to form a business alliance in 1999 
Table 15. Data of Management Efficiency in Yamato
Data 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
[1] 39 30 44 48 39 34 33 35
[2] 3.64 2.32 3.22 4.14 4.48 6.17 4.16 2.10
[3] 21.2 53.7 24.6 22.1 21.6 23.3 25.4 27.4
[4] 20.7 44.2 18.1 18.0 14.3 12.5 12.0 12.5
[5] 13.3 77.2 15.7 12.6 10.5 11.8 14.6 12.7
[6] 0.8 0.001 (－)0.5 0.4 0.1 1.5 2.8 3.5
[7] N/A N/A N/A 489.7 523.5 740.7 836.2 555.4
Source: Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go (Statistics of Life Insurance Business in Japan) for respective 
years.
Data: [1] Premium (billion yen), [2] Return on Assets (%), [3] Expense Ratio (%), [4] Cancella-
tion Ratio(%), [5] New Business Ratio (%), [6] Surplus (billion yen), [7] Solvency Margin Ratio 
(%).
88
aiming to establish a holding company together in the 
near future (see Table 16).
[1] Premium (billion yen)
The amount of premium shrank from 2003 to 
2004 and from 2007 to 2009. It differs from the 
case of Daido where it dwindled to less than half. 
However it is evident that the demutualization did 
not help growing the company. Likewise the ratio 
of new business slightly decreased after the 
demutualization.
[2] Return on Assets (%)
The ROA has been relatively high throughout the 
years before and after the demutualization. But it 
is not the case that the years after demutualiza-
tion are higher than before it.
[3] Expense Ratio (%)
The expense ratio is higher in the years after 
demutualization. So the demutualization did not 
work well for efficiency as far as the expense cost 
is concerned.
[4] Cancellation Ratio (%)
It is conspicuous that the ratio of cancellation is 
especially high in 2003.
[5] New Business Ratio (%)
The ratio of new business was higher than that in 
2003. However it is not likely that the policyhold-
ers made any particular reaction to the demutual-
ization.
[6] Surplus (billion yen)
The amount of surplus is generally the similar 
level before and after the demutualization.
[7] Solvency Margin Ratio (%)
The solvency ratio was 681.5% in 2002 but it 
exceeded 1000 % from 2005 through 2007 and in 
2009.
4) Mitsui Life
Mitsui Life was demutualized in April 1, 2004. Mitsui 
was one of the top 7 traditional insurers in Japan (see 
Table 6). Mitsui was struggling for rather weak sales 
channels and financial bases in 1990s and 2000s. Their 
solvency margin ratio went down to 491.8% as of March 
1998. While banks and non-life insurers belonging to 
Mitsui and Sumitomo groups merged, Mitsui Life could 
not merge with Sumitomo Life, because it was a 
pre-requisition for such merger to re-strengthen their 
financial bases. Mitsui chose to demutualize so as to 
solidify their financial bases and improve profitability 
(see Table 17).
[1] Premium (billion yen)
The amount of premium significantly decreased 
year by year to the level of half of the previous 
years. The ratio of new business also gradually 
deteriorated from 5.9% of 2000 to 3.7% of 2011. 
The demutualization was not effective in expedit-
ing the growth.
[2] Return on Assets (%)
The ROA was 1.86% in 2000 and 1.86% in 2011. 
The years subsequent the 2004 were generally 
better than the preceding years from 2001 
through 2003.
[3] Expense Ratio (%)
The ratios of expense in the subsequent years 
were similar to those of preceding years while 
they deteriorated in 2008 through 2011. The aver-
age of the former 4 years is 15.4% and the average 
of the latter 8 years is 15.2%.
[4] Cancellation Ratio (%)
The ratios of cancellation improved after the 
demutualization with the average of the preced-
ing 4 years being 12.1% and the average of the 
subsequent 8 years being 8.2%.
Table 16. Data of Management Efficiency and Solvency: Taiyo
Data 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
[1] 1,097 1,019 887 794 788 965 813 635 596 640 717 903
[2] 2.52 2.48 1.31 2.15 1.89 2.33 2.31 2.56 (－)0.14 2.11 2.25 2.25
[3] 7.5 8.3 9.7 10.8 10.5 10.0 11.2 12.1 13.4 11.6 11.2 9.2
[4] 8.5 9.1 10.9 17.8 11.2 12.0 10.4 9.3 8.8 8.0 7.6 7.6
[5] 14.5 20.6 20.5 20.5 19.6 18.3 11.4 8.0 9.3 9.5 10.7 9.5
[6] 37.7 136.5 127.1 106.8 108.9 113.8 123.3 128.8 130.1 132.8 137.6 141.7
[7] N/A 768.8 681.5 863.3 865.7 1045.2 1100.4 1000.6 866.4 1023.8 670.8 747.3
Source: Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go (Statistics of Life Insurance Business in Japan) for respective years.
Data: [1] Premium (billion yen), [2] Return on Assets (%), [3] Expense Ratio (%), [4] Cancellation Ratio (%), (E)New Business Ratio (%), 
[6] Surplus (billion yen), [7] Solvency Margin Ratio (%).
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[5] New Business Ratio (%)
The ratio of new business is lower for the follow-
ing years than the preceding years (the average 
of preceding years is 5.9% as against 3.1% of the 
following years).
[6] Surplus (billion yen)
The amount of surplus considerably grew only for 
3 years after the demutualization with the average 
of preceding 4 years being ￥50.5 billion and the 
average of following three years being ￥170.0 bil-
lion. However it worsened to ￥22.5 billion in 2008 
and ￥27.1 billion in 2009.
[7] Solvency Margin Ratio (%)
Likewise the solvency margin ratio slightly 
improved only for several years.
5) Dai-ichi Life
Daiichi Life, the oldest mutual company and the second 
largest life insurance company in Japan was demutual-
ized in April 1, 2010. This is the largest IPO in the histo-
ry of the Tokyo stock exchange market. The number of 
stocks issued was 10 million. The total value of them 
was ￥1.4 trillion. This is the largest stock company in 
Japan in terms of number of the shareholders. There 
are 8.21 million policyholders out of which 7.38 million 
is entitled to receive their share of the assets either by 
stock or cash with the remaining 0.83 million receiving 
no share. Some 1.2 million to 1.3 million policyholders 
were to choose receiving stocks in the amount of ￥40 
billion and 6 million policyholders would receive cash 
in the total amount of ￥1 trillion. The number of the 
shareholders has turned out to be 1.37million.
The offered price of IPO was ￥140,000 and first market 
price was ￥160,000. As of April 30, the price was 
￥160,500 with only five days when the price was below 
￥160,000 in the first 20 days (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
May 1, 2010). The price has never gone down below 
￥140,000 which might be some evidence of the demutu-
alization being well received in the stock market. 
Whether or not there was expropriation or change of 
wealth is a subject of future study.7)
It is rare that the mutual company having over 8 million 
policyholders is converted into a stock company not 
just in Japan but also in the world.8) For instance, the 
number of policyholders was 2.3 million in case of 
Standard Life, over 2 million in case of Friends Provi-
dent, 750,000 in case of Scottish Provident and 600,000 
in case of Equitable in U.K. (Tsuru 2000: 108-112). 
When Daido, Taiyo, and Mitsui were demutualized, the 
number of policyholders was 930,000, 3.82 million and 
2.62 million respectively (Shukan Kinyu Zaisei Jijo, 
April 7, 2008, p.13).
This is an epoch-making event in the history of life 
insurance industry in Japan because 4 largest life insur-
ers in Japan were all mutual companies making it diffi-
cult to compare ef ficiency etc. between mutual and 
stock ownership on equal footing. This study was partly 
motivated by the fact that we now have large stock 
insurer as well as mutual insurers. At that time, Nippon 
was sure that they would continue to be a mutual com-
pany while Meiji Yasuda and Sumitomo were closely 
monitoring the development and studying the issues.
Now that 3 years have passed, this paper examined any 
effects of demutualization chronologically and compara-
tively based on the data of management efficiency of 
both Dai-ichi and Nippon as benchmark data (see Table 
18).
[1] Premium (billion yen)
The average amount of premium from 2004 
through 2009 was ￥3,177 billion and the amount 
Table 17. Data of Management Efficiency and Solvency: Mitsui
Data 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
[1] 1,286 1034 953 920 899 965 813 800 744 640 657 582
[2] 1.86 (－)0.13 0.37 0.99 1.56 2.19 1.93 1.82 (－)1.55 1.50 1.95 1.86
[3] 13.3 16.8 14.1 13.3 12.0 11.8 14.0 15.0 16.4 18.1 16.7 17.5
[4] 11.1 13.8 12.0 11.6 9.2 8.8 8.2 7.8 8.2 8.4 7.4 7.4
[5] 5.9 5.8 6.4 5.3 4.4 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.7 3.7
[6] 62.8 60.1 42.4 36.5 43.4 122.2 198.2 180.5 22.5 27.1 40.9 55.9
[7] N/A 510.7 410.4 654.6 663.9 744.3 906.6 696.1 602.0 702.1 425.8 486.7
Source: Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go (Statistics of Life Insurance Business in Japan) for respective years.
Data: [1] Premium (billion yen), [2] Return on Assets (%), [3] Expense Ratio (%), [4] Cancellation Ratio (%), (E)New Business Ratio (%), 
[6] Surplus (billion yen), [7] Solvency Margin Ratio (%).
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for 2010 and 2011 was ￥3,056 billion making it 
96.2% of the preceding years. For the same peri-
od, the amount of Nippon was ￥4,878 billion, and 
￥4,896 billion for 2010 and ￥5,368 billion for 2011 
with the average being ￥5132 billion after demu-
tualization which is 105.2%. Thus demutualization 
did not contribute to the growth of the company 
at all.
[2] Return on Assets (%)
Although there were the years Dai-ichi achieved 
the ratio comparable to Nippon (2005, 2006, 
2007), the ratio for 2010 and 2011 were inferior to 
those of Nippon (1.78 and 1.99 versus 2.23 and 
2.15). This tells us that demutualization did not 
very well contribute to improvement of ROA.
[3] Expense Ratio (%)
What is conspicuous here is that the ratio for 
2006 and 2007 are fairly high and that the ratio of 
2010 and 2011 recovered to the level of 2004. 
However the ratio for the following years has not 
been so good as the ones of Nippon. It appears 
that the demutualization did not help improve the 
expense ratio.
[4] Cancellation Ratio (%)
The ratio has been lowering year by year slightly 
but no significant difference between Dai-ichi and 
Nippon. This is the data which contradict the the-
ory that the ratio might be worsened by demutu-
alization.
[5] Ratio of new business
The ratio has slightly increased being comparable 
or a little better than Nippon.
[6] Surplus
The amount of surplus dramatically increased 
after the demutualization and it is better than Nip-
pon.
[7] Solvency Ratio (%)
The ratio has become the level of half for the fol-
lowing years but this is due to the change of regu-
lation and it is better than Nippon.
5. Conclusion
The major findings brought by the above analysis are 
summarized as follows (see Table 19).
[1] Premium
All four companies experienced decrease of pre-
mium after the demutualization with the decrease 
of two companies being very significant percent-
age. This suggests that the demutualization did 
not contribute to the growth of the company. 
Between 2001 and 2011, the premium income of 
Table 18. Data of Management Efficiency and Solvency: Dai-ichi and Nippon
Data 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
[1] Dai-ichi 3,530 3,400 3,293 3,098 2,904 2,837 3,056 3,056
Nippon 4,829 4,842 4,854 4,889 5,036 4,817 4,896 5,368
[2] Dai-ichi 1.95 2.11 2.40 2.4 0.22 2.17 1.78 1.99
Nippon 2.42 2.37 2.41 2.45 0.80 2.36 2.23 2.15
[3] Dai-ichi 12.1 12.3 13.2 14.3 15.3 15.5 13.9 13.9
Nippon 11.3 11.1 11.3 11.3 11.2 11.9 11.7 10.7
[4] Dai-ichi 9.0 8.3 8.0 7.2 6.9 6.9 5.7 6.0
Nippon 9.1 8.6 8.3 7.7 7.4 7.2 6.6 6.4
[5] Dai-ichi 5.8 5.7 4.9             4.3 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.5
Nippon 5.9 5.5 4.4 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.4
[6] Dai-ichi 221.0 253.3 265.8 269.9 309.6 184.4 403.0 416.9
Nippon 314.4 350.1 408.1 395.7 300.5 369.4 346.4 342.2
[7] Dai-ichi 891.6 1095.5 1161.8 1016.6 768.1 953.5 547.7 575.9
Nippon 975.2 1257.9 1324.9 1156.8 904.4 1006.0 529.1 567.0
Source: Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go (Statistics of Life Insurance Business in Japan) for respective years.
Data: [1] Premium (billion yen), [2] Return on Assets (%), [3] Expense Ratio (%), [4] Cancellation Ratio (%), (E)New 
Business Ratio (%), [6] Surplus (billion yen), [7] Solvency Margin Ratio (%).
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all life insurers increased from ￥26,185, 887 mil-
lion to ￥29,122,312 million (see Table 20).
[2] ROA
The ROA ratio was almost similar before and 
after the demutualization on all four companies. 
There was no apparent ef fect on performance 
and profitability of the company as a result of 
demutualization.
[3] Expense Ratio
In the two of the five companies, the expense 
ratio has deteriorated with the remaining three 
companies having not much dif ference. This 
means the demutualization did not improve effi-
ciency of the company.
[4] Cancellation Ratio
A development of cancellation ratio is mixed 
among the companies with one having experi-
enced improvement and one having experienced 
setback.
[5] New Business Ratio
The ratio of new business is on the same level for 
three to four years before demutualization and 
two years of the following years.
[6] Surplus
What showed remarkable change is the amount 
of surplus. The amount of surplus dramatically 
increased in two companies with one company 
having increase for short period and decrease for 
long period and with another company posing no 
change.
[7] Solvency Ratio
Most of the companies achieved improvement of 
solvency ratio after the demutualization.
As stated above, the demutualization brought 
adverse effects on growth, efficiency (expense ratio), 
and development of new business. With regards to 
ROA, the ef fects are neutral on all four companies 
except for Yamato. It could be said that the high ROA of 
Yamato was a result of the demutualization but that 
because of the same reason it went bankruptcy. Yamato 
was a small company and the situation surrounding the 
demutualization was unique and different from other 
companies. The demutualization showed a rather 
favorable effect on the ratio of cancellation which is 
inconsistent with the theor y that demutualization 
should not be well taken by policyholders. It definitely 
contributed to the improvement on surplus and solven-
cy. This is a big picture of the five companies demutual-
ized.
However if you take a look at each company individu-
Table 19. Scorecard by Index and Company
Company
Index Daido Yamato Taiyo Mitsui Dai-ichi
[1] Growth (－) (－) (0) (－) (－) (－) (－)
[2] ROA (0) (+) (0) (0) (0)
[3] Expense Ratio (－) (－) (－) (0) (0)
[4] Cancellation (0) (+) (－) (+) (+)
[5] New Business (－) (0) (0) (－) (0)
[6] Surplus (+) (+) (+) (0) (+)a) & (－)b) (+) (+)
[7] Solvency (+) N / A (+) (+) (+)
Source: Prepared by the author.
Notes: (－) means decrease or aggravation. (－) (－) means significant decrease or aggravation. (0) means no 
change or similar level. (+) means increase or improvement. (+)(+) means significant increase or improvement.
a) short period. b) long period
Table 20. Premium Growth of All Life Insurers
(unit: million yen)
Year Company Premium Income Policies in Force Total Assets
2001 40 ￥26,185,887 ￥1,664,615,643 ￥184,370,910
2011 42 ￥29,122,312 ￥1,212,633,811 ￥233,264,185
Source: Prepared by the author based on Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go, 2002 and 2012.
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ally, you will come across another picture. Five life 
insurers are very much different each other in terms of 
size and circumstances under which the demutualiza-
tion was made. Daido and Taiyo merged after the 
demutualization. That is to say, merger of the both com-
panies creating the holding company was their purpos-
es of demutualization. In that sense the demutualization 
was successful. The purpose of Yamato was also merger 
with Taisho. However it went bankruptcy after the 
demutualization. It appears that Mitsui who was suffer-
ing from poor performance demutualized for defensive 
purposes. Because they avoided bankruptcy and has 
survived to date by obtaining capital from the compa-
nies belonging to the Mitsui-Sumitomo group, demutu-
alization turned out to be favorable to them. The largest 
shareholder of Mitsui is the Mitsui Sumitomo Bank and 
has received the directors and officers from the bank 
and Sumitomo Life. Although it was demutualized, it is 
an unlisted company. On the contrary, Dai-ichi did not 
seem to have so specific reasons as other companies 
than more general purposes of strategy, corporate cul-
ture etc. In this connection, it is very interesting how 
Dai-ichi will change in comparison to the remaining 
large mutual companies in the long run.
As the reason and purposes for demutualization are 
diverse, any nature and extent of effects as a result of 
demutualization might likewise different according to 
the companies. Under the circumstances, it can be con-
cluded that although the demutualization might have 
served for very specific purposes of each insurer, it did 
not directly influence or improve its efficiency of the 
company and that you cannot say that stock company is 
more advantageous than mutual company in enhancing 
its value. It was once considered that the demutualiza-
tion of Dai-ichi might be a pivotal event for demutualiza-
tion in Japan (Sugino 2011). However as long as Dai-
ichi or other demutualized companies did not prove 
themselves that they improved growth, efficiency, prof-
itability etc. thanks to demutualization, the rest of tradi-
tional mutual companies will have no reason to go 
through the labor and expenses of demutualization 
except that they have some special reason to do that, 
which is generally compatible with the majority of opin-
ions in the preceding studies.
This is the paper presented at the 17th Asia-Pacific 
Risk and Insurance Association annual conference held 
in New York during July 28 through 31, 2013.
Notes
1) There were two Property and Casualty insurers in Japan 
but one was demutualized and another went bankruptcy 
in 2000. The former is Kyoei Mutual Fire and Marine 
Insurance Company which had become mutual company 
in 1946 and went back to stock ownership in 2003.
2) If the Japan Post Life Insurance Co. Ltd. with the premium 
of ￥6,856,486 million is included, the proportion of mutual 
companies is 39.6%.
3) One example of the defensive reason is “sponsored demu-
tualization” which means demutualization to receive capi-
tal assistance from a sponsor (a company merging and 
acquiring the mutual company).
4) Nissan, Toho, Daihyaku, Chiyoda, and Tokyo were mutual 
companies with Taisho and Kyoei being stock companies.
5) The major change of the Commercial Code was made in 
1993 and 2002 introducing outside auditors system and 
governance by three commissions system etc. respective-
ly.
6) In the US, prominence of mutual companies in the insur-
ance industry is one of the most interesting and least 
understood problems for the student of industrial organi-
zation, since mutuals account for almost half of all life 
insurance in force and one quarter of all property and lia-
bility insurance (Hansmann 1985:125). What is in the 
center of many diversified discussions is the agency theo-
ry. The seminal paper on the agency theory is Michael C. 
Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure,”Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–60 
(October 1976) and the pioneers who applied the agency 
theory to insurance industry are David Mayers and Clif-
ford W. Smith (Birkmaier and Laster 1999: 7).
7) There is a great amount of literature on pricing of IPOs 
which shows some evidence of prevalent underpricing 
(Viswanathan 2006: 442).
8) The only exceptions were Metropolitan and Prudential, 
both of which the number of policyholders was 11 million.
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